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CRIMINAL LAW
GOOD FAITH AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE "REASONABLE"
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
EDNA F. BALL*
the disparity of the situations, both flagrant police
INTRODUCTION
misconduct and hapless official error are uniformly
As one of the law's more controversial creations,
subjected to the same stringent sanction. This last
the exclusionary rule has been the target of much
objection may have a profound impact upon the
criticism.' Some critics decry its result - the rule
future operation of the exclusionary rule. Through
excludes reliable, probative evidence from the facta series of opinions issued since 1974, four current
2
finding process and allows the guilty to go free.
members of the United States Supreme Court have
Others question its effectiveness - there is as yet
urged the adoption of a good faith exception to the
no compelling proof that suppression achieves its
exclusionary rule to meet this objection.! Such an
3
goal of deterrence. The most recent objection, and
exception would provide that when an officer acts
one which is gaining support, is aimed at the rule's
nonselective application. The exclusionary rule is in the good faith belief that his conduct is consti-tutional and where he has a reasonable basis for
presently applied indiscriminately, without regard
that belief, the exclusionary rule will not operate.7
to the nature of the underlying violation. Despite
In fourth amendment cases,8 most good faith
violations concern the failure to meet the require* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa; ment of probable cause. Two basic types of violaVisiting Associate Professor of Law, 1978-79, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D., Duke University; tion are possible. First, an officer may make a
judgmental error concerning the existence of facts
L.L.M.; Temple University.
The exclusionary rule, or suppression doctrine, dis- sufficient to constitute probable cause. Such cases
cussed in this article provides for the exclusion of evidence may be characterized as examples of "good faith
obtained in violation of the Constitution. It was first mistake." 9 Second, an officer may rely upon a
applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Later it was statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a
imposed upon the states in Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 warrant which is later invalidated, or a court prec(1961).
Evidence may also be suppressed if it is seized in v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (retroactive application);
violation of statutes or regulations. See, e.g., United States Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (impeachv. Mallory, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); United States v. Mc- ment at trial).
Nabb, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); United States v. McDaniels,
SSee Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609-12 (1975)
355 F. Supp. 1082 (1973).
(Powell, J., concurring in part).
6Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and
For a summary of many criticisms of the rule, see
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule Chief Justice Burger have all expressed their support of
and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 656-84.
the good faith doctrine. See text accompanying notes
2 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,496-98 (1976)
189-200 infia.
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,538 (1976) (White,
(Burger, C. J., concurring); Schneckloth v. -Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 267 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Set also J., dissenting).
sources
cited id at 267 n.24.
8 The fourth amendment of the Constitution of the
3
See, e.g., 428 U.S. at 499-500. See also Wright, Must
United States provides:
the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
REv. 736, 738-41 (1972). Although deterrence is generhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
ally accepted as one of the goals of suppression, it has not
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
been universally accepted as its primary goal or underWarrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, suplying rationale. See text accompanying notes 157-73 infra
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
4There are some circumstances in which the exclusiondescribing the place to be searched, and the persons
ary rule is not applied. However, they do not relate" to
or things to be seized.
the nature of the offense. See United States v. Calandra,
9See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-40 (1976)
414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); Linkletter (White, J., dissenting).
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edent which is later overruled. In each of these objectives.1 3 There is no doubt that this result was
cases, the officer may be deemed to have commit- intended. The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to
ted a "technical violation."10
place certain "great rights" beyond the power of
Arguments concerning the good faith doctrine any branch of government to subvert them for the
have tended to concentrate upon its relationship to alleged good of the people. 4 The fourth amendthe exclusionary rule. This is understandable since ment, in particular, responded to the use in the
the good faith doctrine makes certain debatable colonies of general warrants granting unrestricted
assumptions concerning the rule's rationale, goals powers to search.15 Although by 1789 such warand efficacy. Ultimately, however, the proposed rants had been condemned not only in the new
good faith exception must be examined and judged states but also in England,16 the states were not
in light of the requirements of the fourth amend- satisfied with a constitution which lacked specific
ment.
protection against general warrants and demanded
To that end, the discussion that follows will focus the security
of an explicit guarantee in the Bill of
7
upon the relationship between good faith and the Rights.1
fourth amendment requirement of probable cause.
The fourth amendment prohibits both "unreaIt will explore the extent to which the good faith sonable searches and'seizures" and introduces the
doctrine is supported by historical and decisional requirement of probable cause.1 8 Although the
antecedents, and it will assess the effect which the term "probable cause" has a certain legalistic ring
proposed exception would have upon the interpre- to it, it did not arrive complete with an established
tation of fourth amendment rights." The discus- definition or explanatory annotation. Since its insion is principally concerned with the treatment of herent lack of precision is coupled with the need to
good faith by the United States Supreme Court apply it to varying factual situations, courts conand will emphasize Supreme Court opinions.
struing this provision must ponder not only what
CIVIL LAW IN THE 19Ts CENTURY: DEVELOPING
DOCTRINES OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND GOOD FAITH

The Doctrine of Probable Cause
When the founding fathers elevated the principle of reasonable search and seizure to "constitu-2
tional instead of

...

merely legal significance,"'

they simultaneously engendered an unending constitutional debate over the scope of the restrictions
imposed on the government. As Professor Amsterdam has noted, the Bill of Rights is a profoundly
anti-government document which must often be
seen by those primarily concerned with crime control as thwarting necessary means to legitimate
1°See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12

(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part). In this article, the
term "technical violation" will always refer to a violation
of the fourth amendment resulting from a subsequent
determination that a statute, warrant, or previous court
decision relied upon by the police does not meet constitutional requirements. It should not be confused with the
broader concept of a "procedural violation."
" A related issue is the desirability of a good faith
exception. It is not the purpose of this article either to
explore this question extensively or to resolve it; however,
the issue is briefly examined. See text at notes 230-36

in"i1N. LASSON,

THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

13 (1937). See generally for an excellent history of the early
development of the fourth amendment.

was considered probable cause when the amendment was adopted, but also how that concept
may be fairly applied to the circumstances of subsequent generations. Presumably, if Congress were
13Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 353 (1974).
14I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHrs 46-59 (1965).
"5The most famous general warrants used in the colonies were Writs of Assistance used by customs officers to
detect smuggled goods. Granting a.continuous license to
search at will for the life of the issuing sovereign, the
Writs usually permitted searches wherever the collector's
suspicion directed. N. LASSON, supra note 12, at 51-56.
16In England, the general warrant was condemned in
Entick v. Carrington, XIX State Trials 1029 (1765). In
the colonies, general warrants were prohibited by provisions in the state bills of rights. See N. LASSON, supra note
12, at 79-82.
'7 N. LASSON, supra note 12, at 88-89, 89 n.40.

s The formulation of the fourth amendment with- two
clauses separately providing a right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and a requirement of probable
cause is discussed and persuasively explained by Lasson.
N. LASSON, supra note 12, at 101-03. Although it was
debated whether a search and seizure, as opposed to a
warrant, lacking probable cause was per se "unreasonable," the basic principle now established is that a search
or seizure without probable cause violates the prohibition
in the first clause. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959) (applying the probable cause standard
to a case involving a warrantless search). But cf., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (limited intrusion based on less
than probable cause, discussed in text of notes 143-49
infra.); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (fixed checkpoint border stop without "articulable
suspicion").
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now to enact legislation authorizing "Writs of Assistance," the Court would have no difficulty holding such legislation unconstitutional. The difficulty
lies, now as in the past, with those cases which
involve the close judgments of law enforcement
officials who must assess the existence of probable
cause while in the field.
Looking to the case law of the nineteenth century
for the development of the doctrine of probable
cause, one is immediately struck by the paucity of
cases both in the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts. There are several reasons for this
scarcity. First, the right to appeal to the Supreme
Court in criminal cases was not granted until
1891.' 9 Although this did not preclude Supreme
Court consideration of probable cause, it did confine that consideration to civil cases. As will be
seen, those civil cases are significant to the development of probable cause and illuminate contemporary thought on the issue. However, the fact
remains that the number of early Supreme Court
pronouncements on the subject was markedly limited by the lack of criminal appellate jurisdiction.
The slow expansion of general federal criminal
jurisdiction limited the handling of cases involving
probable cause by the lower federal courts as well.
Prior to the late nineteenth century, Congress
rarely exercised its power to legislate in criminal
areas and most federal criminal cases dealt with
maritime crime or crimes directly injurious to the
central government2m Finally, beginning with the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, monopoly, prohibition, kidnapping and narcotics successively became notable targets of Congressional action and
federal criminal jurisdiction began its major
growth.21 Because this growth commenced almost
simultaneously with the bestowal of federal appellate criminal review, opportunities to construe the
fourth amendment were effectively increased.
Nonetheless, since the fourth amendment was not
held applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment until 1949, the most extensive development of search and seizure law remained far
ahead.s" It was not until Mapp v. Ohi6o2 imposed
9
' See Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 827. This act also
created the circuit courts of appeals and authorized them
to review certain criminal cases.
The Supreme Court was always able to review habeas
corpus petitions. See, eg., Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 8 US. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
a0 e Schwartz, FedoralCriminalJurisdiinand Proseutors'Discretion,13 L &Com-ra. PNon. 64,65-67 (1948).
21See N. LAssoN, supra note 12, at 106.
2 The fourth amendment was declared to be applica-

the exclusionary rule upon the states and Fay v.
Noia? opened the floodgates of habeas corpus review, that the doctrine found its fullest use and
expression.
There were, of course, some early state cases
dealing with probable cause, since many states had
a constitution or bill of rights containing language5
equivalent to that of the fourth amendment.2
However, even in the state courts there were very
few criminal cases which raised the issue. At that
time, there was no valid objection to pertinent
evidence obtained through illegal search or seizure.
If the evidence was otherwise admissible, the courts
would not inquire into its acquisition.2s Consequently, in both state and federal jurisdictions, the
ble to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). In 1833, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal courts unless otherwise
expressly provided. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833). Later, the Court explicitly stated that the
fourth amendment only restrained the issue of warrants
under federal law and was not applicable to state process.
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855). Although after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
in 1868, the issue of the application of the amendment to
the states through the fourteenth amendment was raised
several times before the Supreme Court, the Court managed to side-step the question until Wolf See, e.g., Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909);
Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541
(1908); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). For a
discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of CririnalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L.
Rev. 929,933-40 (1965).
2 367 US. 643 (1961).
2 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The floodgates were partially
closed by Sone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which
limited a state prisoner's access to federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.
2 See, eg., Connor v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa.
1810) construing PA. CoNsr. art. 9, § 8, which provided
in pertinent part that:
... the people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and that no warrant to search
any place or to seize any person or things, shall
issue, without describing them as nearly as may be,
nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation2.,e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass (2 Met.)
329 (1841). The groundwork for the suppression of illegally obtained evidence was laid in Boyd v. United
States, 116 US. 616 (1886), which equated compulsory
production of evidence against oneself in violation of the
fifth amendment with an unreasonable search and seizure, and held that the compelled evidence had been
unconstitutionally admitted- Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), built upon the decision in Boyd and
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initial interpretations of the doctrine of probable of property as a penalty for alleged misconduct
cause are primarily found in civil cases.
and were thus quasi-criminal in nature.SS The
Civil suits in which probable cause was an im- "probable cause" which was defined in these civil
portant issue included admiralty cases of seizure cases was the same probable cause requirement
and prize, revenue forfeiture cases, and cases claim- arising in criminal cases.S When the Supreme
ing malicious prosecution. Cases of capture and Court finally attained jurisdiction over criminal
prize often involved demands for compensation for appeals, it both cited and applied the formulations
wrongful seizure,27 and if the seizure was based
developed in the earlier civil decisions.S
upon probable cause, damages would not be
The definition of probable cause arising from
awarded. 2S Similarly, in revenue cases seeking dam- these cases reflects the common origin and concepages for forfeiture or trespass, a showing of probable tual overlap of tort and crime.36 The standard
cause would protect seizing officers from liability.'
imposed demands "reasonable suspicion" and its
Probable cause issues also arose in cases of mali- ultimate delineation is not unlike the "reasonable
cious prosecution, because its absence was not only man" test of tort law. Somewhat less stringent than
a key element of the action,s ° but also raised an the construction of probable cause which subseinference of malice.ai
quently developed, it adheres to rules of reasonable
Because probable cause was often dispositive of justification which antedate the terminology
37
these claims, the Supreme Court and the lower "probable cause."
federal courts were frequently required to define
One of the earliest cases defining probable cause
the concept and determine its existence in partic- isMurray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,ss an admiralty
ular civil situations. Although the contexts were case in which one of the appellant's argued that
slightly different from those of criminal cases, the probable cause should excuse him from damages
relationship to criminal law was clear. Malicious resulting from wrongful captureS Chief Justice
prosecution presupposed the initiation of a crimi- Marshall wrote for the court and held that probanal proceeding. t 2 Capture, prize and forfeiture all ble cause required "substantial reason for believinvolved seizures which deprived the injured party ing" that the vessel could be legally seized, 4° and
established the exclusionary rule by holding that evidence
secured in violation of the fourth amendment would not
be admissible in federal court.
27
See

I CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL

PEACE, PRIZE CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1918, at 2 (1923). Prize cases here

include those involving capture, recapture and forfeiture
for violation of revenue and embargo acts. Sometimes the
term "prize" is used narrowly to refer only to seizures in
time of war. See, e.g., United States v. Reindeer, 27 F.
Cas. 758, 768 (C.C.D.R.I. 1844) (No. 16,145).
ssThe Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 372 (1824);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 122 (1804).
'See, e.g., Averill v. Smith, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 82, 91
(1872) (trespass); Sixty Pipes of Brandy, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 421, 425-26 (1825) (forfeiture). Often a statute
would protect the collector from liability in cases of
wrongful seizure where there was reasonable cause for
the seizure by requiring the court to issue a certificate of
probable cause which would effectively bar claims. See,
e.g., Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 643-44 (1878).
aThe elements of an action for malicious prosecution
are: (1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by
the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the
proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; (4) "malice" or a primary
purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.
W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 835 (4th ed. 1971).
31 Id. at

839.

' See note 30 supra.

would be satisfied only by facts furnishing 'just
cause of suspicion.' 1 Later Marshall refined this
ssSee Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
"[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the
forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences
committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are
in their nature criminal."
m See Hall, Interrelationsof Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 753 (1943).
5
See, e.g. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441
(1925) (citing Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878));
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-61 (1925)
(citing The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 155 (1865); The
Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); The George, 10
F. Cas. 201 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 5,328); Locke v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813)).
w See generally Hall, supra note 34. The A.L.I. Model
Code of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure, §§ 120.1, 210.1 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1975) uses the term "reasonable cause to
believe" as the equivalent of "probable cause," not in its
historic sense.
' Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (probable cause)
with Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (1780) (reasonably probable grounds of suspicion) and Proposed
Amendment 14 of the Committee of 20 of the Constitutional Convention quoted in N. L.ASON, supra note 12, at
95 n.61 (legal and sufficient cause).
38 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
39
Id.at 122.
4oId
4'Id. at 123.
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view in Locke v. United States " where, somewhat
overconfidently, he stated that "the term 'probable
cause' ... in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and
well known meaning. It imports a seizure made
under dreumstances which warrant suspicion."
The idea of probable cause as a reasonable
ground of suspicion was also voiced by Justice
Washington's charge to the jury as Circuit Justice
in Munns v. De Nemours." In response to his own
query as to the meaning of the term, Washington
did not merely answer "a reasonable ground of
suspicion," but went on to define it further as
"supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief,
that the person accused is guilty of the offence with
which he is charged."' " This formulation clearly
echoes the "reasonable man" standard dominating
the law of torts, a standard which emphasizes
prudent action under the circumstances." Not confined to use in the federal courts, the definition also
was applied by state courts which closely followed
the language in Munns.47
The federal court decisions which construed
probable cause used similar words, varying only
slightly from "circumstances which warrant suspicion ' s to "reasonable suspicion" "9 to "reasonable
ground of suspicion. ' 5° The emphasis in all of these
opinions is upon reasonable search and seizure
based on circumstances which would cause a prudent man to entertain suspicion. That the theory
running through them is consistent was confirmed
by the Supreme Court in its 1878 decision, Stacey
v. Emery.51 Accepting Munns and similar federal and
state cases, the Stacey Court concluded that all of
the definitions are essentially the same and equated
probable cause
with the earlier expression "reason52
able cause."
The nineteenth century interpretation of prob42 11
3 Id

U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).

at 348 (emphasis added).

44 See 17 F. Cas. 993 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9,926).
4Id. at 995.
46 See W. PROSSER,

able cause was thus arguably less exacting than
later constructions. It should not, however, be mistaken for the "mere suspicion" test which was
consistently rejected. Reasonable suspicion had to be
grounded in facts and, where a warrant was involved, supported by oath. Suspicion based upon
common rumor and report was insufficient.53
There had to be factual support.5 The test was not
subjective, but rather imposed objective criteria. In
situations where the underlying facts were not
sufficient to render the suspicion reasonable, the
Court condemned the attendant search or seizure.ss
Good Faith Mistake
The early civil cases also reveal a nascent good
faith doctrine. These cases may be conceptually
divided into the same subcategories of good faith
mistake and technical violation that would be governed by the suggested good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. However, unlike their contemporary counterparts, they do not share a common
basis for disposition. Although the early cases involving technical violations, like those defining
probable cause, may be directly linked to modem
criminal doctrines, they depart from the modem
view in both analysig and resolution. On the other
hand, the early cases involving good faith mistake
are even more analogous to present criminal cases
and they will be seen to adhere fairly closely to the
theory and result of the proposed good faith exception.
In examining good faith mistake, it is necessary
to return again to actions grounded in tort. Under
tort law, two types of concessions are generally
made to the good faith or proper motivation of a
party who causes an injury. First, although he may
actually be held liable for his wrongful actions, a
well-meaning party is likely to escape the imposition of punitive damages.' Second, a well-intentioned party, by definition, will not provide the
requisite element of intentional wrongdoing or
malice that is required to sustain certain causes of

supra note 30, at 149-51, 157.
47 See, e.g., McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881);
Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Denio 616, 619 (N.Y. 1846).
5 See, e.g., Connor v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38 (Pa.
4The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 155, 162 (1865);
1810).
The George, 10 F. Cas. 201, 202 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)
4 See, e.g., Ex Parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448,
(No. 5,328).
451 (1806).
49 Sixty Pipes of Brandy, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 421, 427
wSee, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
"(2 Cranch) 64 (1804); See also Ex Parte Bollman &
(1825).
0
5 The Thompson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 155, 163 (1865);
Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (citing article 10
United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 723, 724 of the Virginia Bill of Rights).
'6 See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, at 9-11. Punitive
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16,130).
5'97 U.S. 642 (1878).
damages have been called an invasion of ideas of criminal
n2d. at 645-46.
law into the field of torts. IdJat 9.
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Both of these concessions to good faith

error are illustrated by the civil cases dealing with
unintentional mistakes as to the ixistence of probable cause. In the context of punitive damages,
Murray v. Schooner CharmingBetsys presents an initial
treatment of good faith error by Chief Justice
Marshall.
In Charming Betsy, an errant captain who without
probable cause had seized a ship was protected
from the imposition of punitive damages by what
amounted to good faith. Because the circumstances
of the case produced a conviction in the Court that
the captain had "acted upon correct motives from
a sense of duty," the fact that he trusted suspicions
too "light" to constitute probable cause did not
result in added damages. 59 Although the Court
affirmed compensation for actual damages, 60 the
violation of constitutional rights did not in itself
command a remedy. In fact, the idea of redress for
the unlawful seizure does not appear to have been
considered by Marshall. Not unlike modem juries
hearing claims against police officers, the Chief
Justice was primarily concerned that a public officer attempting to do his duty might be subjected
to an oppressive judgment. 6 '
An officer who acted in good faith could fare
equally well in malicious prosecution cases. Because malice was required in addition to an absence
of probable cause, if the officer could establish that
he acted upon proper motivation, he could escape
liability for his unlawful conduct. Both state and
federal courts relied on this principle, 62 and although a lack of probable cause would give rise to
an inference of malice, the defendant who could
6
refute that inference would suffer no sanction. 3
The law governing malicious prosecution can
thus be reduced to three equations:
First, no probable cause plus risalice equals sanction; here both elements required to sustain the
cause of action are present.
Second, probable cause plus malice equals no
sanction; here the existence of probable cause makes
the conduct lawful.
57hd at 23-25.

U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
0 Id. at 124.

586

6o Id. at 125.
61 Id.

at 124.

62 See, e.g., Munns v. De Nemours, 17 F. Cas. 993, 995

(C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9,926); Foshay v. Ferguson, 2
Denio 616, 619-20 (N.Y. 1846); Ulmer v. Leland, I Me.
135, 137-38 (1820).
6 See, e.g., Munns v. De Nemours, 17 F. Cas. 993, 995
(C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 9,926).
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Third, no probable cause plus no malice equals
no sanction; despite the lack of probable cause,
proper motivation precludes liability.
An evidentiary rule to the first equation is that no
probable cause will result in an inference of malic.
and will thus lead to sanction unless the inference
is rebutted.
Although lack of malice is not quite the same as
good faith, it is sufficiently analogous to permit a
direct comparison of these equations with the principles which govern the imposition of the sanction
of exclusion in cases of search and seizure. The
formulae governing the relationship between probable cause and good faith in search and seizure
cases can be established by substituting a lack of
good faith for malice in the original equations:
First, no probable cause plus no good faith equals
sanction; the evidence is excluded.
Second, probable cause plus no good faith equals
no sanction; probable cause makes the conduct
lawful.
Third, no probable cause plus good faith equals
sanction; at present, the exclusionary rule is applied
in the absence of probable cause notwithstanding
the officer's good faith.
Because this third theorem renders good faith irrelevant where there is no probable cause, an evidentiary rule dealing with inferences likewise becomes inconsequential.
It is only in the third equation that the treatment
of motivation in search and seizure cases differs
from that in malicious prosecution cases, and it is
precisely here that the proposed good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would work a change
that would bring them into total conformity. Under the good faith exception, no probable cause
plus good faith would equal no sanction, that is,
no exclusion of evidence obtained through unlawful search or seizure. As in malicious prosecution
cases, proper motive would bar the imposition of
sanctions for unlawful acts. While an evidentiary
rule related to the first equation was unnecessary
when the lack of probable cause alone dictated a
sanction, a useful rule could now be established.
No probable cause would result in an inference of
no good faith and would also lead to sanction
unless the inference were rebutted. Thus, quite
appropriately, should the state fail to meet its
burden of establishing probable cause, supression
would continue to be the presumed result and
would only be avoided if the state affirmatively
established good faith.

GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

One may well ask why the teaching of early civil
cases is relevant to the development of modem
rules of criminal procedure. The question is particularly apt when, as in cases of malicious prosecution, these are doctrines which still possess vitality
and could be dismissed as a feature unique to that
area of the substantive law. Putting aside the conceptual overlap of tort and crime, perhaps the best
answer is that the nineteenth century civil cases
dealing with unintentional mistake concerning
probable cause gave the early courts their only
opportunities to consider the definition of probable
cause and the effect that good faith would have on
the implementation of that doctrine. Since the
Court has been willing to use these decisions to
define probable cause in later criminal cases, 64 it is
not inappropriate to look to them for guidance in
the area of good faith as well. Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself continues to cite civil cases on good
faith and probable cause for guidance in criminal
cases.
For instance, Director General v. Kastenban,65 a
false imprisonment case, has been cited by the
Court for the proposition that good faith does not
constitute probable cause.66 Although this is a fair
reading of the case, Kastenbaun cannot'be read as
making good faith irrelevant to probable cause in
criminal cases. It is one thing to say that good faith
does not equal probable cause; it is quite another
to say that where there is no probable cause, good
faith will not affect the imposition of a sanction.
Likewise, a case su6h as Stacey v. Emery, which holds
that malice or good faith is not an element where
the question is not motive but probable cause,
should not be interpreted to mean that good faith
cannot temper the effect of a lack of probable
cause.67 In Stacey, probable cause had already been
established; however, the petitioner sought damages on the theory that malice negated probable
cause. Consequently, the case merely reiterates the
principle that probable cause always provides a
lawful basis for search and seizure, regardless of
motive, a point that was clearly made by the
second equation derived from the malicious prosecution and the search and seizure cases.
6 See cases cited note 35 supra. Justice McReynolds
also argued that reliance on the civil cases was misplaced.
See text accompanying notes 106-10 infra.
6 263 U.S. 25 (1923).
"See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959);
Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 161 (1924).
67
See Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878). &t also
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).

Rather than being used as a basis for ignoring
good faith, the civil cases involving mistaken judgments could better be interpreted as indicating
that valid concessions to good faith error may be
made. Although the treatment of motive in relation
to probable cause under tort law may not be
directly applicable to the modern law of criminal
procedure, it does demonstrate that, at least on the
civil side, there may be violations of constitutional
rights which result in neither sanction nor remedy.
Whether this approach should be extended to the
criminal arena and the application of the exclusionary rule is a question which may depend upon
the source of the suppression doctrine no less than
upon policy for its answer. If instead of being a
deterrent sanction, or a remedy, the exclusionary
rule is actually part of a constitutional right, it is
the constitution which will require a different treatment of the good faith mistake.e8
Technical Violations
Technical violations result not from an officer's
reasonable but mistaken judgment as to facts constituting probable cause, but rather from his reasonable conduct predicated upon apparently valid
legal directives. 69 Today, when an officer relies
upon a statute or a statutory construction which is
later rejected by the court as unconstitutional or
incorrect, his action could be considered a technical
violation and any challenged evidence could be
eligible for the proposed good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. 0
During the nineteenth century, this situation
was analyzed in a theoretically different, but functionally consonant way. Although, as a practical
matter, both in the past and under the proposed
'See text accompanying notes 157-75 infra.
69 As previously defined, technical violations of the
fourth amendment are those which occur because an.
officer acted in reliance upon a statute which is later
declared unconstitutional, a warrant which is rejected as
insufficient, or an interpretation of the law which is
subsequently overruled. &e Introduction and note 11
sup'ra.
See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 591, 611-12
(Powell, J., concurring); Peltier v. United States, 422
U.S. 531 (1975). Peltier was a retroactivity case and was
decided upon principles established in preceding cases
concerning the retroactive application of constitutional
rulings. See id at 535. However, the bulk of the majority
opinion is devoted to establishing that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule do not require retroactive
application in cases where officials acted in good faith
reliance upon administrative regulations and judicial
opinions. See id at 536-542 and text accompanying notes
76-89 and notes 174-228 infra.
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good faith exception the official conduct would not
be penalized, the reason for this treatment has
changed. Where there would now be a determination that a violation of the fourth amendment
will not be punished because of the officer's good
faith, in the past there was a determination that
the existence of probable cause rendered the seizure
reasonable.
An illustrative case is United States v. The Re-

corder,"1 which concerned a ship seized for violating
federal navigation laws. The forfeiture was based
upon a construction of the navigation act which
had been adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury
in conformity with an opinion of the Attorney
General. 72 When the case was heard, the court
decided that the official construction was erroneous
and that the statute had not been violated.73 However, despite the fact that the correct construction
of the statute did not provide grounds for arrest,
the court also held that the officer was entitled to
a certificate of probable cause. Because the attorney general's opinion had afforded the seizing officer a fair reason for believing that the law had
to have
been violated, the seizure was considered
74
been based upon reasonable grounds.
The theory underlying this case75 is that just as
probable cause could be based on facts which
furnish a reasonable ground of suspicion, so too it
could be based on a statute or statutory construc-

tion which does the same. Moreover, a subsequent
determination that there was no valid authorization for the seizure did not destroy that reasonable

ground or give rise to a sanction. All that was
necessary was that a reasonable reading of the
statute or construction warranted the officer in his
belief that the search or seizure was authorized at
the time it was conducted.
Peltier v. United States,76 which prompted Justice
Brennan's most impassioned attack on the good
faith doctrine, is factually similar to The Recorder
7
and the other early cases. In Peltier, border patrol
agents had conducted a warrantless automobile

search pursuant to a federal statute authorizing
such searches "within a reasonable distance from
78
any external boundary of the United States."
Administrative regulations defined a "reasonable
distance" as up to one hundred miles, and federal
courts repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of
searches under the Act.79 In 1973, the Supreme
Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

that the accepted construction of the Act was
unconstitutional and that such searches violated
the fourth amendment.'o Peltier's conviction was

based on evidence seized during a search conducted
pursuant to the Act four months before the decision
in Almeida-Sanchez.

5

Peltier asserted that the evi-

dence used to convict him should have been suppressed because of the illegality of the search. However the Court ruled that Almeida-Sanchez would
7"27 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16,130).
not be applied retroactively and thus refused to
72 Id. at 723.
exclude the evidence.8
The Peltier Court looked to the purposes of the
' United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 718
(C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1849) (No. 16,129).
74
exclusionary rule and concluded that neither ju1d.
dicial integrity nor deterrence required a retroac"sUnited States v. The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 825
(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 5,125) is similar to The Recorder. tive application of Almeida-Sanchez. The Court beIn The Friendship,a ship was seized under a statute which lieved that the use of evidence seized by officers
was interpreted differently in different judicial circuits. who acted "in good faith compliance with the
The disputed construction was of Section 2 of the Act then-prevailing constitutional norms" does not ofof April 25, 1808, 2 Stat. 499. There was originally some
uncertainty as to whether the ship was being detained
under Section 11 of the same act, which did not require
probable cause but only an opinion of the officer that
there was an intent to violate the embargo act. See Section
11 of the Act of April 25, 1808, 2 Stat. 501. Although
Section 11 probably violated the fourth amendment,
cases construing it do not reflect the Court's interpretation of probable cause. See, e.g., Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 339 (1815); Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 93 (1814). It has been aptly suggested that the
Court was remiss in not declaring Section 11 and similar
legislation unconstitutional. See Stengel, The Background of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
Part Two, 4 U. RIcH. L. REv. 60, 75 (1969). Two years
after the seizure of the Friendship, the Supreme Court
resolved the conflict in The Paulina v. United States, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 52 (1812). The Court rejected the inter-

fend the "imperative of judicial integrity" even if
pretation which allowed the seizure of the Friendship.
Based on The Paulina, the Friendshipcourt certified probable cause since the seizure was supportable under the

rejected interpretation.
76422 U.S. 531 (1975).
77See note 75 supra.
78 See 422 U.S. at 539-40 and the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §,1357(a)(3), quoted
id.
at n.6.
' Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 539-40 & n.8
(1975). But see idt at 545-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8°413 U.S. 266 (1973).
81Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 532 (1975).
'2Id. at 542.
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a subsequent decision broadens the exclusionary
rule to include such evidenceas Further, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be
served by its application to police conduct undera
taken in good faith.8
Given the agents'justifiable
reliance upon a validly eqacted statute supported

by administrative regulations and judicial ap-

proval, the Court held that nothing required that
the evidence be suppressed.ss
The parallels between Peltierand the earlier cases
are easily drawn. For instance, the officers in both
Peltier and The Recorder acted in reliance upon an
erroneous statutory construction promulgated by
the Attorney General.86 Similarly, in both Peltier
and United States v. The Friendship,8 the rejected
construction had received prior judicial approval
and the Supreme Court decision which invalidated
the construction was announced subsequent to the
challenged seizure. Where Peltier diverges from the
earlier cases is in its underlying premise.

Peltier is based on the principle that where an
officer acts in good faith reliance upon statutes,
regulations and federal court decisions, the evidence obtained from his search and seizure should
not be excluded if a subsequent court decision
renders such searches and seizures unconstitutional. The Court assumes that the challenged

search and seizure is unconstitutional under the
fourth amendment, but it declares that because of
the officer's good faith, the exclusionary sanction
should not be applied. In contrast, the premise

underlying the nineteenth century cases is that
there has been no violation of the fourth amendment because the judicial and administrative constructions of the statutes then in existence gave the
officers probable cause to believe that the law had
been violated. This theory could not have been
applied in Peltier because the construction relied
upon by the officers merely gave them reason to
believe that their searches were valid despite a lack
of either warrants or probable cause. The statute
was read as authorizing a border search which did
not require probable cause.88 Because of this funId at 536-37.
8 Id at 538-39.
SId at 542.
Compare Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)
8

with United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 723

(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 16, 130).
8

ComparePeltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531 (1975),

with United States v. The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 825
(C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 5, 125).
Border searches of anyone are permissible without
probable cause based on the sovereign right of the nation

damental difference in Peltier, a difference which
necessitates a reliance upon retroactivity principles
while stressing the good faith doctrine, Peltier itself
could not be treated like the early cases. This is not
true, however, of other cases involving technical
violations which raise the issue of good faith so
For instance, in Stone v. Powell ° the court of
appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, in
part, because it was based on evidence found when
he was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordinance
later held unconstitutional. Although the arresting
officers were enforcing statutes in good faith, the
court of appeals felt that excluding the evidence
might deter legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes."t Although the good faith issue was
briefed and argued before the Supreme Court,92
the case was decided on the scope of the availability
of federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners. 9
Nonetheless, the argument for a good faith exception is clearly presented in Justice White's dissent
which shares the outlook of the majority opinion
on limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule.
As stated in White's dissent, when an officer acts
on the basis of a statute which is later held unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied, he is
merely doing his duty in good faith and on reasonable grounds. Although there has been an invasion
of the defendant's privacy, the defendant has no
to protect its territorial integrity through the exclusion of
foreign nationals. Persons entering the country may be
required to identify themselves as entitled to enter and
their belongings as effects which may lawfully be brought
into the country. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 154 (1925); Note, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'rL L. 277,
291 (1976).
8 See note 75 supra. On October 2, 1978, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Michigan v. De Fillippo, 80
Mich. App. 197, 262 N.W.2d 921 (1977), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 76 (1978), and will consider the question of whether
an arrest made in good faith reliance on an ordinance
which had not then been declared unconstitutional, is
valid without regard to the constitutionality of the statute
ordinance. In its petition for certiorari, the state claimed
that the application of the exclusionary rule would serve
no purpose because it could have no deterrent effect. It
cites United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), in
support of this position. The petition argues that the
Court should consider both the existence of probable
cause and the application of a good faith exception to

the exclusionary rule for a "technical violation."
90507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'don othergrounds, 428
U.S. 465 (1976).
9' Id. at 98.
92 See Brief for Petitioner at 11-38, Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465 (1975); Brief for Petitioner, at 35-38, and Brief
for Respondent at 41-57, Wolff v. Rice (companion case).
9 428 U.S. at 494-95.
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right to civil damages and he should not be entitled support for acknowledging the importance of the
to the exclusion of any probative evidence which officer's good faith and for not imposing suppreswas seized.94 Exclusion in such cases could have no sion.
deterrent effect and judicial integrity would not be
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE 20TH CENTURY:
impaired when evidence is admitted after a violaPROBABLE CAUSE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
tion has occurred, particularly when there has been
only "mistaken, but unintentional
and faultless,
The seventy-five years between 1886 and 1961
95
conduct by enforcement officers."
encompassed a second era of fourth amendment
Implicit in Justice White's analysis is the as- development. Beginning with Boyd v. United States
sumption that the search was in violation of the and ending with Mapp v. Ohio, the period was
fourth amendment. However, the analysis applied marked by several significant changes in the realm
to the early admiralty cases could easily be used. of criminal justice.97 Federal criminal jurisdiction
Under that theory a reasonable although mistaken began its great expansions the suppression docreliance upon the validity of a statute or construc- trine was formulated and imposed on the federal
tion of a statute is sufficient to establish probable courts,9 and a substantial number of criminal cases
cause, and that probable cause continues to render construing the fourth amendment were amassed.
the search reasonable even when the statute or Although expanded criminal jurisdiction was influconstruction is subsequently rejected. It would be ential, it was the suppression doctrine which
consistent with that approach to hold that the prompted the litigation that led to definitive Susearch in Stone was legal and, consequently, that preme Court decisions. Once a violation of the
the exclusionary rule was inapplicable.9 The valid- fourth amendment could have a practical effect
ity of a search or seizure would be measured against upon the disposition of cases, the interpretation of
the facts and law known to an officer at the time its requirements became central to many appeals.
he acts. The subsequent acquisition of information
that proves that a person is innocent of the crime
Fourth Amendment Requirements Evolve
for which he was arrested neither negates probable
The primary evolution of fourth amendment
cause at the time of arrest nor requires that evidoctrine away from the theory of the nineteenth
dence seized incident to that arrest be suppressed.
century coincided with Prohibition and reflected
Likewise, the subsequent pronouncement of the
the political and social objectives of the time. The
misconstruction or unconstitutionality of a statute
eighteenth amendment became effective on Januneed not render seizures invalid.
ary 16, 1920, and out of twenty-three search and
At first glance, this theory seems to go much
seizure decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
further than Peltier in its effect upon the seizure;
between 1921 and 1938, t ° 0 eighteen involved liquor
however, the practical effects of the two positions
are the same, that is, no sanction or remedy results.
The good faith exception thus functions consist97 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), presaged
ently with its nineteenth century precursors to the the adoption of the exclusionary rule in an opinion which
extent that it credits the reasonableness of conduct ruled against the admissibility of evidence which the
predicated upon apparent law and shields the defendent was compelled to produce against himself in
violation of the fifth amendment. The compulsory proofficial's conduct from sanction. Although accord- duction
in violation of the fifth amendment was considing to modem interpretation these searches and ered an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
seizures may now be considered as violations of the amendment. For an analysis of the decision in Boyd, see
fourth amendment, the early cases at least provide J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
49-61 (1966).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the excluId. at 540-42 (White, J., dissenting).
sionary rule to the states.
' Id.
at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
H8 See text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
9 Although the statute in Stone was invalidated on due
99
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
process grounds, it is possible for a vagrancy statute to be
held unconstitutional because it violates the fourth (evidence obtained by federil officers in violation of the
amendment requirement of probable cause by permitting fourth amendment held inadmissible in federal court);
arrests on mere suspicion. See United States v. Hall, 459 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (state courts not
F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, this would not required to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
change the officer's reasonable basis for a good faith fourth amendment).
'00 See Appendix to Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
belief that he was making an arrest based on probable
145, 175-81 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Olincause.
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or prohibition. 101 During the 1920's, eight out of
twelve cases upheld the admissibility of challenged
evidehce; however, as prohibition became increasingly unpopular and prosecutions for violations
were disfavored, the trend was reversed. After 1930,
seizure was upheld in only two cases; in all of the
others the evidence was ruled inadmissible.1e2 This
increased use of the exclusionary rule to soften the
enforcement of prohibition also occurred in the
states, many of which had adopted their own
ver3
sion of the rule for precisely that purpose.'1
Prohibition gave the courts their first concerted
opportunity to define searches and seizures within
the fourth amendment, and if any case can be
considered as providing the keynote to this era, it
is Carroll v. United States.'°4 The first prohibition
case to reach the Supreme Court, Carrollproduced
both a majority opinion which espoused the nineteenth century view of probable cause and a dissenting opinion which called for the more stringent
requirements that soon developed. Significantly,
the majority opinion was written by Chief Justice
Taft, whose leadership dominated the Court's policies in the 1920's.'05 The dissent was authored by
Justice McReynolds, who would join in many of
the decisions excluding evidence in the thirties and
write several of them."°
Although Carrollis best known for establishing
the moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement,lr 7 ChiefJustice Taft's opinion also carefully considered the issue of probable cause. Taft's
initial premise was that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
is to be construed in the light of what was deemed
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was

stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), is omitted
from the Appendix because itheld that a wiretap did not
constitute a search and seizure. This analysis was later
rejected in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'0'In fact, only one search and seizure case between
1925 and 1938 was not related to liquor- Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
'02The cases upholding seizure were Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), and Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938).
't3See Canon, Is the a&cuia Rule in Failing Health?

Some New Data and a PleaAgainst a PreapitousCbundrion,62
Ky. UJ.681, 682 n.1I (1974).
'0 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10

5ChiefJustice Taft's term ran from 1921 to 1930.
""'Justioe McReynolds wrote the majority opinions in

Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932), and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
107 Carroll upheld the warrantless search of a moving
vehicle based upon probable cause. 267 U.S. at 153.
tmltI at 149.

adopted, and in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens."1 s Turning to familiar authority such as Stacey v. Emery,1° 9 Taft defined probable
cause as facts and circumstances "such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing
that an offense has been committed." 10 Cases such
as Locke, The George, The Thompson and Munns v. De
Nemours were also cited, but the approach of the
Court was most clearly indicated by its reliance on
McCarthy v.De Annit. The Court in that case had
stated that the substance of all definitions of probable cause
is "a reasonable ground for belief in
'1
guilt.
In dissent, Justice McReynolds perceived the
same facts as establishing an illegal search incident'
to an arrest based on "mere suspicion."' 1 Responding to the majority's use of nineteenth century civil
cases for precedent, McReynolds argued that forfeiture and tort cases should not be controlling,
particularly cases which turned on express statutory provisions inapplicable to the case at hand." 3
The weakness of this position becomes apparent
when it is noted that McReynolds did not directly
attack any of the cases actually cited in the majority opinion. Rather, he cited a distinguishable line
of cases which not only do not control, but also
differ significantly from the cases upon which the
majority did rely. The early cases which Justice
McReynolds listed involved statutes purporting to
authorize arrest or seizure upon opinion or "mere
suspicion," and in no way involved a determination
of the requirements for 'probable cause.11 4 Conversely, all of the cases cited by the majority, where
the issue was raised, did require the establishment
of probable cause and thus could serve as precedent
for the case at hand.
"9 97 U.S. 642 (1878). See also text accompanying notes

44-52
1 supra

olt at 161 (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642,

645 (1878)).
"'See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S;-132, 161

(1925) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69
(1881)).
112267

U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).

1Id at 163.

"4The cases dismissed as irrelevant in the dissenting
opinion were: Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
197 (1845); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342
(1842); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818);
Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339 (1815); United
States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398
(1814); Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94
(1814). See note 75 spra which discusses the statutory
provision construed in Croiwell and Otis.
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Whether or not McReynolds' dissenting opinion
is persuasive, it is of interest because of the way it
viewed the facts. While the majority had reviewed
the facts of record and had come to the conclusion
that they were sufficient to establish probable
cause, the dissent labeled the same facts as providing "mere suspicion." Since there were some objective facts upon which the seizing officers relied and
the seizure was not based only on rumor or inchoate
hunch, the difference between the two assessments
must be based upon the different approaches to
probable cause. While the majority was satisfied
that the facts supplied a reasonable ground for
belief as required by previous decisions, the dissent
wanted something more and laid a foundation for
the coming liberal construction of fourth amendment requirements.
During the 1930's, the stricter construction prevailed and the previously noted increase in cases
requiring suppression resulted. Some of these cases
imposed stricter requirements to establish probable
cause. For instance, the Court in Sgro v. United
States" 5 held that a strict construction of the
amendment required new evidence of probable
cause to justify reissuance of a lapsed warrant.
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prior to Carroll and that most of the "liberal"
construction followed in its wake."2°
World War II provided the Court a brief respite
from search and seizure cases; however, in the late
forties a second siege began. Between' 1947 and
1961, a myriad of cases addressing issues such as
scope, protected areas and standing began to fill
out the contours of the amendment.' 2 ' As many
commentators have noted, this fleshing out of
fourth amendment theory has never been done
with great consistency or logic,l '2 and not all of the
decisions in this period reflect a liberal approach.ss
However, decisions during this period generally
evinced continuing progress in that direction and
led the Court toward the criminal law revolution
1
of the sixties.'
Good Faith Reposes

A number of cases between Boyd and Mapp addressed the issue of good faith, although never as
the actual basis for a decision and always from a
negative perspective. The basic view expressed at
the time was that the fourth amendment should
be construed to prevent an encroachment on rights
"by well-meaning but mistakenly over-zealous exSimilarly, United States v. Lejkowitz" 6 curbed the ecutive officers. ' 5 The usual context in which
scope of a search incident to arrest, and Taylor v. good faith arose was that of enforcing the warrant
United States117 invalidated a search that had been requirement against earnest policemen.
conducted without a warrant despite ample time
For example, when the Court in Johnson v.United
to obtain one.
States12 ' affirmed the importance of authorizing
When in 1947 Justice Frankfurter dissented from searches through an impartial magistrate, it rec-

what he considered the retrogressive decision in
Harris v. United States,"" he attached an appendix

of search and seizure cases that had been decided
between 1914 and 1946. His purpose was to illustrate that "with only an occasional deviation,"' 1 9
a series of Supreme Court decisions had construed
the fourth amendment liberally to safeguard the
right of privacy. What a survey of the appendix
actually reveals is that "deviation" was common

"5 287 U.S. 206 (1932). See e.g., Rose v. United States,
45 F.2d. 459 (8th Cir. 1930) (allegations in affidavit must
be consistent with the facts later proven to establish
probable cause); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124
(1932) (conclusory allegations insufficient).
"6 285 U.S. 452 (1932). However, the law concerning
the proper scope of a search incident to arrest remained
unsettled until Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
117
286 U.S. 1 (1932).
Il' Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151-75 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 159.

120
Id. at 175-81. See also id. at 151-75 for Frankfurter's
conclusion that this decision is retrogressive.
121See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747

(1952) (protected area); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951) (standing); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581 (1948) (scope).
'22 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 349-52.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) (permitting broad scope for search incident to
arrest); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
Harris and Rabinowitz were overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Landynski, In Search
of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORIHAM L. REV.
453, 454 (1976).
5
See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958) (conclusory allegations of probable cause insufficient for warrant); United States v. Di.Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948) (limiting search of persons on premises).
"5 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
In Gouled, a liberal construction meant that a warrantless
seizure of evidence through stealth was just as unreasonable as one accomplished by force or coercion.
226 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is not
often grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
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ognized the danger of trusting the judgment of
officers aggressively fighting crime. Likewise, Tmpiano v. United States"2 held that law enforcement
officers must secure and use search warrants whenever reasonably practicable, warning that "in their
understandable zeal to ferret out crime," police
officers are less likely to possess the neutrality necessary to protect a suspect's rights. Because these
cases involved volitional failures to abide by the
warrant requirement, rather than mistaken judgments as to the existence of probable cause, they
are not relevant to a discussion of a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. The good faith
exception is designed to apply to situations in
which there is a good faith belief that constitutional
requirements are being met. It is not meant to
encompass situations likeJohnsonor Trupiano,where
intentional violations are motivated by a desire to
achieve salutory law enforcement goals.
Harris v. United Statesus was another case that
hinged on the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. Although the Court there validated a broad
warrantless search by characterizing it as incident
to a valid arrest, in effect it really permitted a
general ransacking of the premises without judicial
authorization. Dissenting Justice Murphy protested the majority's holding, pointing out that it
had substituted the good intentions of the arresting
officer for constitutional safeguards.' 29,The inadequacy of such a substitute was illustrated not only
by history, but also by Harrisitself which was later
overruled in Chimel v. California." However, since
the good faith exception does not purport to substitute good faith for the warrant requirement, any
more than it purports to substitute good faith for
probable cause, it does not conflict with either
Justice Murphy's position or the ultimate position
voiced in Chimel.
The only case prior to Mapp in which the issue
of good faith was considered in relation to probable
cause was Henry v. United States.131 Justice Douglas
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id at 13-14.
'2 334 U.S. 609, 705 (1948).
"2 33 1 U.S. 145 (1947).
9
2 Id at 193 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
t-o 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limiting scope of warrantless
search incident to arrest).
131361 U.S. 98 (1959).

used that case to review the historical and decisional background to the doctrine of probable
cause and to reiterate that "good faith on the part
of the arresting officers is not enough." 3 2 Since the
facts relied on to arrest the defendant were meager
and did not reasonably provide more than "mere
suspicion" of guilt, it is doubtful that the good
faith exception would even be applicable to the
Henry decision. Under the exception, a good faith
belief must also be reasonable. It is pertinent to
note, however, that even this strong opinion by
Justice Douglas did not offer any reason to ignore
good faith when an officer acts not only in good
faith, but reasonably as well.
The ExclusionaryRule Impels
This overview of pre-Mappcases alluding to good
faith illustrates that the concept was not then being
analyzed from the perspective of the suppression
doctrine. This did not change until Mapp applied
the exclusionary rule to the states and moved the
suppression doctrine out into the streets.
Mapp was important not only because it resulted
in an increase in the volume of suppression cases,
but also because the suppression doctrine had previously'been developing in the greenhouse environment of federal prosecution. Although law enforcement at the federal level was not always sophisticated and well-coordinated,' 33 it was somewhat
isolated from the pressures facing local patrolmen
policing high crime districts. Consequently, the
doctrine which evolved prior to Mapp was influenced by the context in which it arose and was not
entirely responsive to the legitimate needs of law
enforcement at the local level. The impact of the
imposition of the exclusionary rule upon the states
was not immediately apparent. However, throughout the sixties it became increasingly evident.
Much of the doctrinal reassessment of the 1970's
has been an attempt to alleviate the pressures on
the criminal justice system created by coupling a
liberal interpretation of the fourth amendment
with an expansive application of the exclusionary
rule. However, the Warren Court itself began a
modest accommodation to the needs of law enforcement as early as the mid-1960's. One of its steps
which affected the law concerning probable cause
and good faith-was its confirmation of the preferenqe to be granted to searches under warrants.
at 100-02.
e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931).
'32Id

'33See,
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When a challenged search was based on a warrant,
reviewing courts were entitled to accept evidence
of a less judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified a search without a
warrant.34 This preference accorded to warrants
was defended as an encouragement to officers to
resort to warrants, but the acknowledgment of
police good faith is evident.ss It was explicitly
stated in United States v. Ventrescas13 that the Court
was equally concerned with upholding the actions
of law enforcement officers who consistentiy followed the proper constitutional course.
The practical result of this philosophy is to validate seizures under doubtful warrants and to admit evidence which might well have been excluded
had there been no warrant. This is conceptually
similar to applying a good faith exception to seizures based upon a warrant which is subsequently
held invalid, and it is functionally identical. The
chief objection to this preference is the one voiced
by Justice Douglas in his dissent to Ventresca. The
Constitution also binds magistrates and their actions are reviewable for violations as well. 3 7
The issue raised by Justice Douglas also raises
questions about treating police action based upon
good faith reliance on a defective warrant as a
technical violation of the fourth amendment. In
such cases, not merely the good faith of the officer
is involved, but also the good faith of the magistrate. Given the preference already granted to warrants under Ventresca, it is arguably departing much
too far from the spirit of the amendment to permit
what amounts to a second indulgence concerning
its requirements. Certainly, it may be criticized as
ignoring the history of warrants that resulted in an
absolute requirement in the Constitution that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
In his noted essay on search, seizure and surveillance, Professor Taylor reviewed the eighteenth
century history leading to the fourth amendment
and concluded that the amendment was prompted
'3' See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109-12
(1965); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960).
"3Cf Franks v. Delaware, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2685 (1978)
(Franks reaffirmed the presumption of validity of the
affidavit supporting the search warrant and predicated
the right to a hearing upon a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement in the affidavit was included deliberately or with reckless disregard for the
truth. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake were
held to be insufficient to trigger a hearing).
' 380 U.S. at 111-12.
'37
Id. at 117 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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not by a general fear of unreasonable searches, but
by a specific concern about overreaching warrants.is 8 Whether or not one accepts his further
conclusions that the framers of the Constitution
"were not at all concerned about searches without
warrants"' 39 or his attendant views regarding the
range of reasonable warrantless searches, his assessment that the abuse of warrants was40 particularly
feared must be recognized as sound.1
In light of this, to except searches from the
exclusionary rule because of an officer's good faith
reliance on a defective warrant is to jeopardize a
strict tenet of the amendment. In direct violation
of the Constitution, warrants could issue without
probable cause, and negligent or partial magistrates could rely upon the good faith of executing
officers to negate the deficiency. 4 1 Warrants are
already afforded a "good faith test" at the magistrate level since under Ventresca, they are reviewed
with a generous eye to the reasonableness of the
magistrate's factual evaluation. An added good
faith exception can be challenged as unnecessary
as well as dangerous. The danger alone constitutes
sufficient reason to reassess the inclusion of good
faith reliance on defective warrants as a technical
violation of the amendment. 42
Another major concession of the Warren Court
to the realities of local law enforcement was Terry
v. Ohio.'4 With Terry, the Court partially backtracked from the stringent requirements of probable cause to a more flexible reasonableness standard which balanced the justification against the
intrusion.' 44 Besides recognizing the limited useful-

3

1 8 See

T.

TAYLOR,

INTERPRETATION 24-41

Two STUDIES
(1969).

IN CONSTITUTIONAL

3

' 9 Id. at 43.
'40 For a thoughtful

appraisal of Taylor's analysis
which accepts his assessment of history, but not his
ultimate conclusions concerning the fourth amendment,
see Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 409-15.
141Although modem search and seizure law assumes
the neutrality of magistrates, historically magistrates were
politically influenced and wielded executive as well as
judicial power. For "an historical look at magisterial
neutrality and the general warrant," see Farrar, Aspects
of Police Search and Seizure Without Warrant in England and
the UnitedStates, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 491,550-58 (1975).

142A good faith arrest based upon a warrant which is
later invalidated is characterized as a "technical violation" by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion to
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J.
concurring).

,43
392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1"4Id. at 20-27. For comprehensive discussion of the
meaning of Terry, see LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
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ness of the exclusionary rule, 4 the opinion held
that facts which do not meet the modern probable
cause test might nonetheless be sufficient to justify
a limited search and seizure that would be reasonable under the fourth amendment. Where specific
and articulable facts, judged against an objective
standard, warranted a reasonable man in the belief
that a limited intrusion was appropriate, a stop
and frisk was sanctioned.' 46 This was not a return
to the old standard under which a reasonable
suspicion equalled probable cause, but it was a
formula delineating reasonable suspicion as a constitutional basis for a limited invasion of privacy.
When the Court abolished the "silver platter
doctrine" in Elkins v. United States,1 47 it surmised
that it could not have been forseen that such a rule
would engender practical difficulties in an era of
expanding federal criminal jurisdiction. Much the
same thing could have been said concerning the
effects of the suppression doctrine, and Terry sought
to alleviate some of the practical difficulties of
enforcing the law within the Fourth Amendment.
However, because Terry was restricted to a narrow
set of circumstances, it was only partially successful
in moderating the double burden of a liberal fourth
amendment working in tandem with the exclusionary rule. Reaction against the exclusionary rule
continued to mount and, ultimately, it was left to
the Burger Court to respond by curbing the applicability of the rule. One method of accomplishing
this was by expanding the list of exigent circumstances which would permit warrantless searches."4
Another method was the establishment of the deterrence rationale as the exclusive justification for
suppression. 149 This rationale would require proof
that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence would
deter future illegal seizures, before evidence would
be suppressed. However, a more workable rationale, if adopted, would be the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.

GOOD

NESS"

It has been shown that since early in the nation's
history not every violation of the fourth amendment has resulted in a remedy or sanction. In civil
cases, good faith has long had an effect upon the
imposition of sanctions for official action taken
without probable cause. This effect continues today. A modern example is the federal civil rights
section 1983 action which was specifically designed
to provide a federal cause of action for violations
of constitutional rights by state officers.so The
section 1983 action has been held applicable to
51
cases concerning illegal searches and seizures.1
Consistent with early precedent, the action may be
defeated by a showing of good faith.152
For reasons previously discussed, criminal cases
concerned with the relationship between good faith
and the fourth amendment did not arise during
the nineteeth century.15 3 Thereafter, the suppression doctrine and expanded criminal jurisdiction
made the issue a logical one; however, there was
no serious consideration of the effect of good faith
until the 1970's.
There are several possible explanations for this
apparent judicial oversight. The first is that whenever the Court contemplated the issue of good
faith, it asked the wrong question. The question
that it posed was the one that was discussed in
Henry v.UnitedStates and Beck v.Ohio: whether good

faith on the part of the arresting officer was sufficient to constitute probable cause.'" The resounding and proper answer to this question is "no".5
Certainly, good faith is not an acceptable substitute
for facts and circumstances warranting "anofficer's
belief. However, the correct question would have
been whether, given an absence of probable cause,
good faith should affect the decision to suppress.
i50 4 2

Constitution" Tery, Sibron, Peters, and Bqond, 67 MiC-. L
REv. 39 (1968).
'45 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 13-14.
146,r at 20-22.
,47 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
,48 Se Lewis, Justice Stewart and Fourth Amendment Probable Cause: "Swing Voter" or Partciant in a "New Majori'?, 22 Loy. L REv. 713, 717 & n.29 (1976).
" Sre text accompanying notes 159-73 infra- "Tlhe

rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974).

FAITH AND THE RruRN TO "REASONABLE-

US.C.§ 1983 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.

167 (1961).
5
' ' See Monroe i.Pape, 365 U.S. 167.
2
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monaghan,
Forewrc- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1,
41 (1975). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); QGeller, supra note 1, at
693-94.
3
See
- text accompanying notes 19-25 supra
54
' See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1965); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).

uZ"Ifsubjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate,
and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 US. 89,97 (1965).
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As the review of pre-Mapp cases illustrated, this
was never discussed.' 56
A second explanation for the oversight is that
the Court was not yet motivated to attempt to
curtail the exclusionary rule. As a relatively new
doctrine and one that was restricted to the federal
arena, it had not yet revealed its limitations. On
the contrary, particularly during the last years of
prohibition, suppression was a useful tool which
promoted a popular policy. It was not until the
post-Mapp era that the doctrine's weaknesses became apparent.
These two explanations were probably responsible for the initial neglect of good faith. A third
explanation, though, emerges as the likely reason
for continued inattention to the doctrine. The theoretical basis for the exclusionary rule has been
mutable and elusive almost since the rule's conception.1 57 Constitutional scholars continue to explore
its theoretical underpinningssas The viability of a
good faith exception is greatly influenced by this
theoretical basis. If exclusion is considered a constitutional right, the Court would have a constitutional duty to uphold it and could not dispense
with it simply because of good faith. For that
reason, it was important for the Court to establish
another rationale for exclusion prior to proposing
a good faith exception.
In United States v. Calandra," the Court estab-

lished a rationale which has been integral to both
curbing the application of the exclusionary rule
and legitimizing the emerging good faith doctrine.
The Calandra Court held that witnesses before a
grand jury may not refuse to answer questions
based on evidence obtained from unlawful search
and seizure. t6° This decision was based on a deter156See, text
'57 Among

accompanying notes 126-32.
the theories relied upon are deterrence,

judicial integrity, a fourth amendment constitutional
right and a combined fourth and fifth amendment constitutional right.
158
See, e.g., Schrock and Welsh, Up from Calandra: The
Exclusionary Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 251 (1974). This article argues that there are two
personal constitutional rights to exclusion, one based on
the fourth amendment and one based on due process. A
due process basis for exclusion is also argued in Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional
Principle, 69J. CRiM. L. & C. 141 (1978).
5 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
"6 o Id. The Supreme Court, however, reached a different result in applying the federal wiretap statute, Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20. In Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
a grand jury witness who has refused to testify about
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mination that the exclusionary rule "is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent

effect, rather than a personal constitutional right
16
Selectively gleaning supof the party aggrieved."
portive ideas from prior cases while omitting cont 62
trary authority, the opinion elevated deterrence
to prime importance and refused to accept the
dissent's position that the exclusionary rule is that
"part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's lim-

itation" and founded on the imperative ofjudicial
integrity. 63 While the dissent viewed deterrence as
"at best only a hoped for effect of the rule" and
thus highlighted other historical objectives of ex-

clusion,564 the majority refused to apply the rule
where the deterrent goal would not be significantly
furthered.lss
To the extent that this exaltation of the deterrence rationale is accepted, it destroys the reason
for suppression whenever the sanction cannot be

demonstrated to have a least potential deterrent
effect. 166 Therefore, Calandralaid the basis for subsequent curtailment of the exclusionary rule. Since
situations involving good faith violations rarely
lend themselves to deterrence, they naturally provide a category of cases1 in which suppression is
arguably inappropriate. 6
Although it is important for the proposed excep-

tion to establish deterrence as the basis for the
exclusionary rule, doing so raises another constitutional problem. If the exclusionary rule is not a
constitutional right, there is some question as to

intercepted communications or in response to questions
based on intercepted communications may assert the
illegality of the wiretap as a defense to a contempt charge.
See also 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 505 (1977).
16' 414 U.S. at 348.
:62Compare iL at 347 with Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
63United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
'64Id. at 355-67.
165
Id. at 349-52 (Opinion of the Court).
'66Empirical studies have failed either to prove or
disprove the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. See,
e.g., Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized
Evidence, 1965 Wisc. L. REv. 283; Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHt. L. REv.
665 (1970); Spiotto, An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STuDis 243 (1973).
167 Although retroactivity cases involve other considerations as well, deterrence is also a prominent factor in
their decision. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 359-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Linldetter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
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whether it may be imposed on the states as a
remedial rule.168 In extending the exclusionary rule
to the states, Mapp v. Ohio held that as a matter of
constitutional law, a state court must suppress
evidence seized as a result of violation of the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. 6 Both deterrence
and judicial integrity were used as justifications for
the holding1 70 however, the authority for imposing
the rule on the states was that it was an indispensable part of the fourth amendment. If this is not
true and the rule is ajudicially-fashioned remedial
device, it may be argued that the states
should be
72
free to substitute their own remedies.'
In summary, if the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated, it could not be disregarded on
occasions when it does not further deterrent goals.
Exclusion would be required in any case in which
there had been a violation of constitutional rights,
including those cases involving good faith violations. If, however, the rule is not part of a constitutional right, there would be no constituti6nal
obstacle to adding an exception to the judiciallycreated remedy. There might then be a question as
to the authority for imposing the exclusionary rule
on the states; however, where the rule is unquestionably validly imposed, as in the federal courts,
the good faith exception would be constitutionally
sound. 173
The Modem Good Faith Doctrine
If it is assumed that the exclusion of evidence is
not a constitutional right, the policy considerations
governing whether or not there should be a good
faith exception demand consideration. 74 The basic
68

See Monaghan supra note 152 at 2-6.

t6 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). It should be remembered

that Mapp was a plurality opinion, joined by only four
members of the Court. Justice Black concurred in the
result, but based upon his unique view of the relationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments. See id. at
661-62 (Black, J., concurring).
- Id. at 658-59.
171Id. at 655-57.
'72See Monaghan supra note 152 at 2-6. See also Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1561 (1972).
' It has been suggested that even if exclusion is not a
constitutional right the Court might nonetheless have a
common law power to implement federally guaranteed
rights. See Monaghan, supra note 152, at 10-20. Monaghan also sees little reason why there should not be a
good faith defense to the exclusionary rule, at least where
police conduct is not at issue, particularly since good
faith is a recognized defense to § 1983 actions. It at 41.
174It is recognized that all of the Court's decisions are
inherently statements ofjudicial policy, and that deter-

premises supporting the evolving good faith doctrine have been developed in four Supreme Court
decisions issued subsequent to Calandra.1 75
The relationship between good faith and the
deterrence rationale was initially delineated in
Michigan v. Tucker,1 76 a fifth amendment case that
admitted the fruits of a Mirandaviolation. In Tucker,
the Court stated that prior to penalizing police
error by suppression of evidence, it would consider
whether exclusion would serve a valid and useful
purpose.'7 Since the deterrent goal of the exclusionary rule is to instill a greater degree of care in
officers who have violated a defendant's rights
through willful or negligent conduct, it was determined that this purpose would not be served where
the officers had acted in complete good faith.17
The decision to admit the evidence in Tucker
relied on several factors besides good faith, including the voluntariness of the defendant's statements 9 and the reliability of the derivative evidence. 18° And, as suggested by the concurring opinion, the decision possibly could have rested upon

minations of what constitute constitutional rights are
equally influenced by policy considerations. As Justice
White once observed:
[Tihe Court has not discovered or found the law in
making today's decision, nor has it derived it from
some irrefutable sources; what it has done isto make
new law and new public policy in much the same
way that it has in the course of interpreting other
great'clauses of the Constitution. This is what the
Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what it
must do and will continue to do until and unless
there is some fundamental change in the constitutional distribution of governmental powers.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
'7SThe facts of Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971), which preceded Calandra,potentially could have
raised the issue of a good faith exception; however,
neither Justice Powell nor Justice Rehnquist had as yet
been appointed to the court, and the idea was not even
suggested.
S76See
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Although the application of a good faith exception to
violations of the fifth amendment raises issues beyond the
scope of this article, this case has contributed to the
overall good faith rationale and will be discussed for that
limited reason.
The officer's error in Tucker was a failure to give a
complete Mirandawarning at an interrogation which took
place prior to the Miranda decision. For the requirements
under Miranda, see 384 U.S. 436.
'7 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,446 (1974).
1
'78Id.at 447.
79 It at 444-45.
8oIdat 448-49.
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retroactivity principles instead. 18 ' However, the
opinion in Tucker was nonetheless significant, because it evidenced the new willingness of some
members of the court to consider the nature of the
illegality when determining
the applicability of the
8
exclusionary rule.' 2
The next major decision highlighting the issue
of good faith was Peltierv. United States.'

83
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deterrence and judicial integrity, and found that
neither competing interest was at odds- with the
good faith rationale.
A limited guide to the kinds of police conduct
which may be considered good faith violations, was
presented in Justice Powell's concurring opinion to
Brown v. Ilinois.'89 Using a sliding scale, Powell

placed flagrantly abusive violations at one extreme
and "technical" violations on the other.'9g Flagrant
violations included pretext arrests or unnecessarily
intrusive invasions of personal privacy.'
Technical violations included arrests based on good faith
reliance on a warrant later invalidated and arrests
pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional.' 92
In cases of flagrant violation, Powell accepted
that both deterrent goals and the mandate to
preserve judicial integrity would demand that the
fruits of official misconduct be excluded.'93 However, in cases involving technical violations, neither
of those factors justified the
4 suppression of reliable
and probative evidence.1
Taken together, these opinions in Tucker, Peltier
and Brown accept deterrence as the primary reason
for exclusion, argue that neither deterrence nor
judicial integrity warrant exclusion in cases involving good faith violations, and provide examples of
technical violations to which a good faith exception
would apply. All of this doctrinal development
occurred within the first eighteen months following
Calandra,and all of it was promulgated in opinions
authored by either Justice Powell or Justice Rehnquist.'95 Almost exactly one year later, the next
major contributions to the doctrine of good faith
181Id. at 453-59 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also were provided in connection with Stone v. Powetl.
However, this time the advocates of the doctrine
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (exclusionary rule
were Chief Justice Burger and Justice White.
given prospective application based upon good faith
Peltierhas

already been discussed to some extent, 84 its contributions to the development of the good faith doctrine warrant further exploration. Although the
case was decided on retroactivity grounds, the
Court did examine good faith in light of both the
deterrence rationale and the imperative of judicial
integrity. First, the Court looked at prior retroactivity cases and interpreted them as establishing
that if officers reasonably believed in good faith
that their conduct was in accordance with existing
law, the imperative of judicial integrity would not
be offended if decisions subsequent to the seizure
held that their conduct was unconstitutional.""
The courts would not be "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold" where no willful disobedience existed.' 86
Next, turning to the deterrence rationale, the
Peltier Court maintained that evidence obtained
from a search should be suppressed only if the
seizing officers "had knowledge or may be properly
charged with knowledge that the search was unconstitutional.' 87 This was simply a reiteration of
Tucker's willful or negligent conduct criterion ap89
plied to violations of the fourth amendment.
Peltier thus judged good faith in relation to both

reliance on overruled decision).
'82 Prior to Tucker, the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § 290.2 (Official Draft, 1975) recommended that there should be suppression only where the
violation was "substantial." One factor to be considered
in determining whether the violation was substantial was
the extent to which the violation was willful.
The Bentsen Bill, proposed in 1972, similarly sought
to limit the application of the exclusionary rule to substantial violations. S. 2657, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
The American Bar Association went on record as
opposed to this bill, and the legislation was never enacted.
See 12 CRIM. L. REp. (BNA) 2429-31 (1973).
'83 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
'8 See text accompanying notes 76-89.
'85Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 535-38
(1975).
186Id at 536 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223).
'88 Pettier,422 U.S. at 542.
' Id. at 539 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.

"9 422 U.S. 590, 606-16 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part). Brown rejected a per se rule that Miranda warnings automatically purged the taint of a defendant's
illegal arrest and held that two inculpatory statements
were inadmissible.
'90 Id. at 610. A similar idea was proposed in Wright,
supra note 3, at 744-45.
91Id. at 611.
192 Id.

'93 Id "In such cases the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be effective, and the corresponding mandate to preserve judicial integrity.., most
clearly demands that the fruits of official misconduct be
denied." Id (Citations omitted).
954 id at 612.
' Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in

both Tucker and Peltier;Justice Powell wrote the concurring opinion in Brown.

GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

The issue of good faith was raised by the facts in a second type of good-faith violation-good faith
mistake. The examples of good faith mistake given
Stone v. Powell, but it was not a basis for the Court's
decision.196 Instead, the issue appeared promi- by White involved officers making difficult judgments concerning the existence of probable cause
nantly in both Chief justice Burger's concurring
based on available facts.2 5 Thus, the good faith
opinion and Justice White's dissent.
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion ac- exception which White proposed imposed two retually added little other than moral support to the quirements on both technical violations and good
proposed good faith exception. Its main theme was faith mistakes: (1) a good faith belief that the
that the cost of exclusion is far too high to justify conduct was legal, and (2) reasonable grounds for
its use when its deterrent effect is unproven. 97 The that belief.2 6
Unlike technical violations always involving auexclusion of reliable, probative evidence from the
fact-finding process, Burger believed to be a "sense- thoritative pronouncements which establish a realess obstacle to arriving at truth in many criminal sonable basis for believing that there is probable
cause, good faith mistakes involvejudgmental error
trials," particularly those involving evidence seized
in good faith.'96 He noted that the rule is presently which may or may not have been reasonable. For
instance, a policeman may possess undisputed facts
applied indiscriminately to all types of fourth
concerning a suspect and be convinced by those
amendment violations 99 and suggested that it
would be wiser either to abolish the rule entirely or
facts that he has probable cause to arrest. Those
to limit its scope to egregious bad faith conduct." ° facts may indeed overwhelmingly establish probable cause, and if that is so, the arrest will not be
Burger's opinion was basically a general attack
vulnerable to challenge. However, they might also
on the exclusionary rule using good faith violations
as an example of the excessive use of the "Dracon- be so weak that no reasonable officer would ever
view them as.establishing probable cause. In such
ian, discredited device in its present absolutist
form". 0 Burger did, however, make a minor con- cases, no amount of good faith on the part of the
tribution to the good faith doctrine by dividing officer would be sufficient to meet the second regood faith violations into the two subcategories quirement of the good faith exception.
The cases to which the good faith exception
used throughout this article. Although he did not
would apply lie somewhere between these two
proceed to analyze the two categories, he did seem
to recognize the conceptual difference between
extremes. They include situations where the officer
202
acted as a reasonable officer would and should act
good faith mistakes and technical violations.
This difference was more clearly illustrated in the in similar circumstances, but where courts have
ultimately determined that in their view the officer
dissenting opinion ofJustice White.
Prior to justice White's dissent in Stone, opinions was mistaken.207 justice White argued that in such
discussing good faith had concentrated upon tech- cases the exclusion of evidence will have no deternical violations such as conduct predicated upon rent effect, because officers doing their duty will
an invalid statute.' While White's dissent also act the same way in similar future cases.a Given
examined technical violations,204 he did recognize that this is so, the only consequence of suppression
will be the exclusion of truth from the fact-finding
process. 2 0 This result is posited as no more appro196See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Powell
was arrested pursuant to an ordinance which was later priate in cases of good faith mistake than it is in
held unconstitutional. In the companion case of Wolff v. cases of technical violation.
Rice, evidence had been seized pursuant to a wanrant
Interestingly, Justice White also contrasted the
which was subsequently invalidated.
treatment of good faith in criminal suppression
19See id at 496-502 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
cases with that in civil damage cases. He pointed
98Id at 501-02, (quoting justice Whites dissent, 428
out that an officer is excused from civil liability
U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting)).
both when he has acted under a statute which he
'9 428 U.S. at 499, 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
2I0 d at 501. Chief Justice Burger expressed similar
reasonably believed to be valid but which was later
ideas when he was still ajudge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Burger, Who
2 5
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-39 (White,
Will Watch the Watchmam, 14 AM. U. L Ray. 1 (1964).
21428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
J. dissenting).
=Id at 499.

See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring).
SSee text accompanying notes 95-96.
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m7 rd at 539-40.
2M Id
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held unconstitutional, and when he has mistakenly has done this in his dissent to Peltier v. United
2 15
but reasonably believed that he had probable cause States.
10
for an arrest. In Justice White's view, it makes
In Peltier, Justice Brennan principally argued
little sense to exclude reliable and probative evi- that the good faith rationale wrongly assumes that
dence when the defendant is not even entitled to the exclusionary rule seeks to deter by punishment
compensation for invasion of his privacy. 21 1 Al- or threat of punishment. 216 Instead, according to
though he did not harken back to nineteenth cen- Brennan, the purpose of the rule is to deter "by
tury civil precedent, he might very well have done removing the incentives to disregard it." 217 WhenSO.
ever illegal evidence is used in court it creates an
The summarize, the basic position of those who incentive in officers to attempt to evade constitusupport the good faith doctrine is that the exclu- tional requirements. If a law is ambiguous and
sionary rule excludes reliable, probative evidence could reasonably be read to validate a seizure,
from the judicial fact-finding process, and thus officers will be encouraged to opt for the interprehampers the determination of truth. Because exclu- tation which may compromise. fourth amendment
sion is not a constitutional right, it can and should rights. 21 8 Although Justice Brennan did not use, an
be employed only where its underlying rationales example of good faith mistake, there would also be
are served. In cases involving good faith violations, incentive to assume probable cause where the supneither deterrence nor the imperative of judicial porting facts were marginal. Consequently, he beintegrity is positively affected by exclusion. There- lieved that the suppression of evidence seized in
fore, a good faith exception should apply to all good faith could have more than minimal deterrent
cases involving
good faith mistakes or technical effect, because it would remove the incentive to
2 12
violations.
take chances with a suspect's rights in the many
Opponents of the good faith exception need not situations where probable cause is not clear.
uniformly assert that the exclusionary rule is a
Justice Brennan's argument leads logically to the
constitutional right. However, those who do may conclusion that the adoption of a good faith excepmake the obvious threshold argument that the tion will tend to destroy actual good faith in those
Court cannot ignore a constitutional right simply situations where violations are now mainly innobecause it does not advance certain judicial or cent. Because good faith must ultimately bejudged
societal goals. Constitutional rights must usually by an objective standard, officers who believe they
be respected even where they conflict with other can meet the objective criteria will be encouraged
important societal needs. Consequently, a "prag- to attempt the seizure even when they do not
matic analysis" of the exclusionary rule's usefulness believe that there is probable cause. This was
is both inappropriate and unpersuasive given that distressing to Justice Brennan; however, it may not
there are
paramount individual claims to enforce-. distress those members of the Court who have
2 13
ment.

retreated from the strict definition of probable

For the present, however, the Supreme Court
has rejected the theory of constitutional right, and
those who would successfully oppose the good faith
exception must grapple with it from a position
dictated by the deterrence rationale. Justice Brennan, who continues to view the rule as a right,214

cause. Because good faith, either actual or judi-

2 10

Id. at 541.

cially determined, must be coupled with a reasonable basis for believing that there is probable cause,

even cases lacking actual good faith will meet the
reasonableness test. If the true purpose, or even
true result, of good faith exception is to reestablish
a reasonableness test for probable cause, an incen-

211 Id. at 541-42.
212 Compare the ALI

Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures, § 290.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) which
proposes that factors such as willfulness and deterrent
effect be considered in determining whether a violation
will be deemed substantial and therefore require the
suppression of resultant evidence.
213 See Schrock and Welsh, supra note 158, at 272-81.
Justice Powell referred to the "pragmatic analysis of the
exclusionary rule's usefulness" in Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 488 (1976). But see Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionar'Rule, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 1027, 1032-35 (1974).
214 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 509 (1976)

(Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 360 (1974).
21, Justice Brennan does not here oppose the good faith
exception per se, because none was applied in Peltier.
However, he did see that the good faith rationale in
Peltier could be expanded beyond retroactivity cases. See
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26 Id.at 556.
217
Id. at 557, quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
2,8422

U.S. at 559.
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tive to utilize that reasonableness test will not
dissuade its proponents.
General criticisms leveled by Justice Brennan at
the good faith exception are that it will end the
exclusionary rule as it is now known,219 that it will
stop the judicial development of fourth amendment rights, ° and that it will require burdensome
case by case analysis.22' In making the first charge,
Justice Brennan has accurately assessed the good
faith exception as an indirect method of curtailing
the exclusionary rule. However, to use this argument seems merely to express a preferred judicial
policy. It does not amount to reasoning likely to
persuade those who have adopted a different policy, and it does not directly refute that policy.
There is also some merit to Brennan's second
concern. Assuredly, a good faith doctrine would
affect the development of fourth amendment law.
However, it is perhaps overly pessimistic to fear
that the law will "stop dead in its tracks." Moreover, a mere lack of clear precedent on identical
facts would not automatically require denial of
motions to suppress.222 In the absence of probable
cause, an officer would in each case have to establish both a good faith belief and a reasonable basis
for that belief. Although reliance on precedent
might help establish both the belief and the basis,
the absence of precedent "on all fours" would not
in itself save unreasonable conduct. As Justice
Rehnquist suggested in his response to Justice
Brennan's dissent, it is unlikely that good faith will
both stop judicial development by promoting
wholesale automatic denials of suppression and
increase the present burdens on the courts.= Although some increased burden is likely, it is impossible to predict its extent in advance.
The final point which Justice Brennan raised is
that good faith will require a probing of the subjective knowledge of the seizing officer.2 ' Because
the good faith doctrine proposes an objective test
of good faith which parallels that used in civil cases
judging good faith or malice, the questions posed
by Justice Brennan are easily answered. 2
The first question considers what would happen
under the good faith doctrine if an officer believed
551.
f Id. at 554.
22 Id. at 560-61.
2m Brennan predicts this in his dissent. See Peltier, 422
U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
M Id at 542-43 n.13 (Opinion of the Court).
224
See id. at 553, 560-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22' The questions were posed in Justice Brennan's dissent Pettier.
2S9Id. at

a search to be unconstitutional when it was not.
The answer is that the situation would remain as
it is now in criminal cases and as it has been
historically in malicious prosecution cases. The
search would be considered legal because probable
cause existed, and no sanction would be applied.226
Second, it is asked what would happen if a
search was unconstitutional and was believed to be
unconstitutional, although it might reasonably
have been believed to be based upon probable
cause. Under the good faith exception, evidence
would be suppressed as illegal unless the officer
could establish both a good faith belief and a reasonable basis for that belief.227 Where he could not
establish the first requirement, the second alone
would not be sufficient. Consequently, in this situation the good faith exception would not be
applied.
Justice Brennan's second question assumes that
the actual lack of good faith on the part of the
searching officer would somehow be known to the
court. In most cases where the facts could reasonably support a good faith belief, the court is unlikely to have anything before it other than the
officer's assurance that he was convinced he had
probable cause.m Such testimony, whether truthful or perjured, is almost impossible to refute.
Consequently, the most important criterion for use
of the good faith test will be the reasonableness of
the officer's belief when judged on the objective
facts.
The Return to Reasonableness
Proponents of the good faith exception have
urged that it is acceptable because it does not
conflict with the underlying purposes of the exclusionary rule. Critics have argued not only that it
does conflict with the purposes of exclusion, but
also that it may lead to the total demise of the rule.
Both of these approaches are flawed. They tend to
lose sight of the fourth amendment. The good faith
doctrine should not be judged by its effect on the
exclusionary rule but by its effect upon the standards which define when citizens will be protected
against governmental intrusion. To the extent that
probable cause is the key to fourth amendment
protections, the good faith exception diminishes
See text accompanying note 63.
Stone, 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
The exclusionary rule already fosters false testimony
by police officers. See Oaks, supra note 166, at 739-42. For
additional discussion of the problem of police perjury, see
Savilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjuly, 11 SAN
DiEo L. REv. 839 (1974).
27See
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the-liberality of the fourth amendment by reinstituting the reasonableness standard of the nineteenth century.
This happens because the practical result of the
good faith exception is no different than the result
of a seizure based upon probable cause. Where
probable cause supports a search and seizure, there
is no imposition of either civil remedy or exclusionary sanction. Likewise, where a good faith exception is appfied, there will be neither civil relief nor
suppression. Thus, in cases involving good faith,

the requirements of the good faith exception replace the requirement of probable cause as the
determinative test for admissibility or civil remedy.
In other words, what is required is no longer "probable cause" as presently defined, but instead "a
reasonable ground for belief."
In cases of technical violation, both good faith
and its reasonable basis are provided almost by
definition. The officer's conduct is predicated upon
a statute, decision or warrant upon which he was
expected to rely and in most cases actually did rely.
Good faith mistakes require stricter scrutiny under
the objective standard. However, once it is determined that the officer's mistaken judgment was
grounded in a reasonable basis, it will be the rare
case in which the exception will not be applied.?
In most cases, both technical violations and good
faith mistakes will result in the court's proceeding
as though probable cause existed whenever it finds

a reasonable ground for belief.
The adoption of the good faith exception would
correspondingly alter the true extent of fourth
amendment protections. Those who oppose the
exception might well argue that it unconstitutionally subverts the probable cause requirement in
any case in which it is applied. However, as has

been shown throughout this article, there is historical and decisional support not only for legally

acknowledging good faith, but also for defining the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement
in terms of a reasonableness standard. Probable

cause has been viewed differently in the past, and
with a change in judicial policy, it could be viewed
that way again. It would not be surprising to see

the present Supreme Court, which has already
retreated from an expansive treatment of the fourth
amendment, adopt this further measure.

22

' Occasionally, an officer will either demonstrate or

admit to bad faith. In those cases, the exception would
not be applied. See text accompanying notes 224-28 supra.

CONCLUSION

To acknowledge that the good faith exception is
historically and conceptually sound is not to advocate its adoption. It may be that the good faith
exception demands a policy commitment that
should not be made at this point in the twentieth
century.
As a partial return to the "crime control" model
of criminal process, good faith could increase the
efficiency of the process by protecting the use of
probative evidence.23° At the same time, however,
it might also offend the notions of due process
which have taken root in the national consciousness. Although the public is presently impatient
with what it views as excessive solicitude for the
rights of criminals, it is likely to react with a "sense
of injustice" to doctrines which jeopardize the
rights of innocent and guilty alike.231 Of more
direct practical importance is the fact that adoption of the good faith exception might encourage
law enforcers to take less care to respect the rights
of suspects. One of the exclusionary rule's few
conceded accomplishments is that it has increased
police training and awareness about their responsibilities. m A signal from the Court that it is
abating its aggressive enforcement of fourth
amendment requirements is apt to evoke a consistent reslponse from the police.=s
It also may be argued that the twentieth century
needs a more demanding definition of probable
cause than existed in the nineteenth century. Urbanization, pervasive governmental regulation and
modem technology have already combined tojeopo The "crime control" model was posed by Herbert

Packer as an alternative approach to the criminal process.
It presumes that the repression of criminal conduct is the
most important function to be performed by the criminal
process, and it emphasizes the efficient determination of
guilt and disposition of criminals. The alternative is the
"due process" model, which emphasizes protection of the
accused through an adversarial process which places
duties and restrictions upon the government. See H.
PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANarION 149-246

(1968).
The exclusionary rule is regarded as antithetical to the
crime control model. Id at 177-78.
" Id. at 239-40.
m See, e.g., LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through
the Exclusionary Rule (pt. 1), 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 395-96
(1965); (pt. 2) 566 and passim; Oaks, supra note 166, at
708; Spiotto, supra note 166, at 274-75.
' Cf Goldberg, Foreword-The Burger Court 1971 Term:
One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward?, 63 J. Crtm. L. C.
& P. S. 465 (1972) (effect of Supreme Court action on
the moral tone of the country).

19781

GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

ardize what little privacy the average citizen retains. A strict requirement of probable cause may
be necessary to continue to protect the privacy
which remains.
On the other hand, urbanization, the sophistication of modem crime and our increased reliance
upon the government to guarantee our safety have
combined to confront modern law enforcers with
problems unimagined by their predecessors. No less
than in the past, the police now need workable
standards which will enable 4them to act not only
responsibly, but effectively.1

In 1968, Professor Packer warned that the same
decisional process which the Warren Court used to
establish the "due process" model of criminal proc23 The modem conditions which have developed since
the enactment of the fourth amendment and which affect
its implementation are eloquently described in Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 401.

ess might one day be used by the Supreme Court
to reestablish crime control norms.=s He suggested
that the trend could be reversed by either changes
in attitude toward the criminal process or changes
in personnel on the Court.2
Both of these changes have occurred and the
new judicial trend is at odds with the expansive
interpretation of the fourth amendment that has
evolved since the nineteenth century. A good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule is in step with
that trend and may be justified by arguing history,
precedent and policy. However, it should not be
adopted without careful consideration of the requirements of the twentieth century and full cognizance of the effect it will have upon fourth
amendment rights as we know them.

2

See H. PAcKER supra note 230, at 239-40.
See id at 240.

